A Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries by Leruth, Luc & Paul, Elisabeth
ISSN 1608-7143
OECD Journal on Budgeting
Volume 7 – No. 3
© OECD 2007Chapter 1 
A Principal-Agent Theory Approach 
to Public Expenditure Management Systems 
in Developing Countries
by
Luc Leruth and Elisabeth Paul*
A well-functioning public expenditure management system (PEM) is
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A PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY APPROACH TO PUBLIC EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS…1. Introduction
A well-functioning public expenditure management (PEM) system is
considered to be a critical pillar of government efficiency by most
practitioners, who place it on par with a low-distortion tax system and an
efficient tax administration. It is therefore unfortunate that there is so little
economic research on the design of PEM systems, especially on the theoretical
side.1 On the empirical side, papers have generally focused on the efficiency of
public expenditure in key sectors (health and education), and only a few
attempts have been made to quantify the welfare losses associated with a
weak PEM system. They all point to rather high economic costs. For example,
a public spending tracking survey in Uganda concludes that only 13% of
nonsalary expenditures earmarked for primary schools reached the intended
beneficiaries during 1991-95. The bulk of the allocated spending was either
used by public officials for purposes unrelated to education or captured for
private gain (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004). In Ghana, a survey concluded that
20% of nonwage public health expenditure and 50% of nonwage education
expenditure reached the frontline facilities (Ye and Canagarajah, 2002).
The importance of a good PEM system has come to the forefront of the
debate in the context of the debt initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPCs), which provides substantial debt relief from the international
community while requiring eligible countries to pursue good economic policies
and to make their budget more “pro-poor” using the HIPC relief for spending on
priority areas of a country’s poverty reduction strategy. The difficulty in tracking
public expenditure has become clear during the systematic assessment of the
capacity of some 25 HIPCs by international financial institutions.2 Without
getting into the details of the methodology used to assess PEM systems, it is
worth mentioning that it was based on 15 benchmarks (extended to 16 in 2004)
relating to the three main components of budget management.3 The studies
indicate that, while progress has been made since the initiative was launched,
a majority of HIPCs still require substantial upgrading of their PEM systems to
be capable of reliably tracking public spending. In particular, internal control
and the production of final audited accounts are the areas in most need of
strengthening.
The problem is that the list of recommended key reforms for “getting the
basics right” (Schick, 1997) is quite large and, although internal and external
controls are identified as priorities, the list of priorities also covers most otherOECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 7 – No. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 20072
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terms of both financial and human resources, it therefore appears critical to
address the key areas of weaknesses in the most effective way possible.
In this article, we use the well researched principal-agent theoretical
framework to clarify the issues arising in PEM systems and help prioritise the
PEM reform agenda. It has already been argued that a chain of principal-agent
relationships characterises PEM systems, which in turn raises the potential for
agency problems (see, for example, Tanzi, 2000, p. 445).
We interpret corruption and bad governance as stemming from asymmetric
information and interest divergence between those who perform tasks (the
agents) and those on whose behalf tasks are performed (the principals). A rent
can thus be captured by the agents at the expense of their principal.4 The reason
is that a low level of output can be due either to a low exogenous “state of nature”
or to some misbehaviour (such as a low effort level or corruption) by the agent. In
our model, the ministry of finance (MoF) acts as the principal, providing public
funds to line ministries (for example, the ministry of education, the health
ministry, or some other public body) to implement a set of actions. The
relationship between the MoF and the line ministries is an agency problem
subject to asymmetric information both on some external parameters and on
the actions performed. In case of low output, the MoF is not in a position to
distinguish the cause, unless it uses some form of audit. The principal’s problem
is to design the contract that most efficiently forces the agent to meet the
requirements. The contract must therefore specify a level of output (depending
on the state of nature) associated with a certain level of transfer, as well as some
control and sanction parameters.
The MoF has a number of instruments at its disposal to limit rent-seeking
behaviours. These include, in particular, internal controls within the line
ministry. In the so-called francophone system of public expenditure
management (prevailing in most of French-speaking Africa), the MoF usually
places some of its employees in the line ministries, and their duty is to check that
the operations performed by the line ministries comply with the contract. In the
anglophone system (prevailing in most anglophone African countries), the
approach is different: the line ministry is accountable for its performance ex post
(and this is verified by the court of audit) and tries to prevent non-compliance by
having some of its own employees check the operations of others. In a sense, the
head of the line ministry becomes the principal and its employees are the agents.
In most cases (anglophone, francophone or other systems), outcomes are verified
ex post by a court of audit in charge of analysing the performance of the line
ministry and reporting its findings to the relevant authorities (usually
parliament).5 If corruption is detected, the official concerned will be punished by
disciplinary action or through the judicial system, sometimes entailing a hefty
penalty (such as the “mise en débêt” in France).6 These examples suggest that theOECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 7 – No. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2007 3
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potentially very useful model to analyse PEM issues and guide reforms.7 However,
most traditional models do not exactly fit the realities of PEM systems, and
adjustments are needed to take into account their specific features and
constraints. These will be identified and elaborated upon as the model is
developed.8
The article is structured as follows. We interpret a PEM system in light of the
assumptions commonly found in the principal-agent literature in Section 2. We
then present the basic features of the model in Section 3. Section 4 discusses
ex post audits and their value in developing countries, while Section 5 introduces
ex ante controls. We conclude in Section 6.
2. Interpretation of PEM under the principal-agent theory
2.1. The contract
We base our analysis on standard principal-agent models involving
supervision (Kofman and Lawarrée, 1993, 1996; Khalil and Lawarrée, 2006). We
essentially focus on the control of line ministries or assimilated bodies by the
MoF, which is supposed to represent the public interest. Line ministries can be
seen as agents of the MoF (the principal) because they are required to produce a
certain level of public output – including the quality of this output – in exchange
for their budget appropriation. The pair “expenditure programme – budget
appropriation” can be interpreted as the two components of the contract
between the MoF and the line ministries.9 The objective of the MoF is to induce
the line ministries into implementing their expenditure programmes, while the
line ministries pursue their own objectives. That relationship entails both
hidden actions (e.g. the productive “effort” of the civil servants, possible
perquisite consumption, or corruption) and hidden information (e.g. the
exogenous productivity of that particular sector of the economy), with the
agents having the informational advantage over the principal. Hidden
information could also refer to poor programme design, which would lead to
inefficiency and would be difficult to dissociate from the inefficiency originating
from a weak PEM system.10
Importantly, the principal-agent model does not allow for a cheating
principal and, while it may be argued that the case can occur, we do not
consider it in this article.
As already indicated, a number of government operations can be assimilated
to principal-agent relationships. For example, one could consider that the
minister (who is the head of the ministry, but also a political appointee) heading
the line ministry is a principal whose objective is to make sure that his/her agents
(the civil servants) implement what he/she has promised to do. One could also
consider that the parliament is the principal, whose objective is to make sure thatOECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 7 – No. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 20074
A PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY APPROACH TO PUBLIC EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS…the government (the executive) implements the government’s programme. Yet
another example would be to model the central government as the principal,
while the subnational governments are the agents. A paper by Ahmad, Tandberg
and Zhang (2002) looks at this issue, using a principal-agent framework to analyse
incentive structures that best compel local governments to truthfully reveal their
ability to implement national programmes. The paper focuses on the optimal
contract between both levels of governments. It also insists on the need to have a
multi-period game in order to make punishments credible.
An important element of any principal-agent model is to specify an
observable that will be the main element of the contract. When the agent is
the line ministry, measuring performance should ideally be based on a mix of
indicators including output, outcome, and impact. Such information is usually
difficult to obtain, and although simply measuring inputs is clearly not
satisfactory, they are often the only variable for which adequate data are
available. Furthermore, the level of resources in many developing countries,
including the HIPCs, is such that broadening the statistics coverage can lead to
the undesirable consequence of a serious degradation in the quality of data
(i.e. information on inputs). Beyond the availability of data, the complexity of
performing meaningful measurements, and potential biases linked to the use
of performance indicators, it may also not be fully realistic to assume that the
MoF has the capability to judge outcomes. Hence, we will hereafter use the
term “output” in a general sense, i.e. to mean one variable that the MoF is in a
position to measure, and this could include outcomes.
It also follows that we formally model a programme budgeting process,
although the results also apply to countries that do not explicitly use that
approach.11 In our model, line ministries must make proposals on their priorities,
on objectives to be reached, and on corresponding (quantifiable) targets.12 The
line ministry budget proposal is then negotiated with the MoF. However, we do
not model the negotiation process. The contract comprises both:
● the required “output” to be produced by the line ministry (in terms of
provision of public goods and services) and thus, implicitly, the “effort”
required from the line ministry; and
● the line ministry “transfer”, i.e. its budget appropriation.
A menu of possibilities can be included in the contract to take into
account the general economic conditions or make relevant assumptions. For
instance, it could be specified that, under a baseline scenario with realistic
growth prospects, the line ministries are required to operate with their
existing capacities; but, under a more optimistic assumption (the country
receives more debt relief, or the economy experiences higher growth), the line
ministries could make additional investments. In fact, this is increasingly
happening in the context of poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs), whichOECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 7 – No. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2007 5
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resource availability necessary to reach the millennium development goals.13
We assume that, everything else being equal, the line ministry prefers being
granted a large budget appropriation but dislikes the effort associated with the
performance requirements.
2.2. Agency problems
The agency problem arises from the diverging interests of the MoF and
the line ministry and the latter’s informational advantage, both on its own
actions and on the current state of nature. As standard in the principal-agent
literature, the agent’s effort is a necessary component of the production
function, but entails some disutility. The agent may take unfair advantage of
its superior information: if external conditions are favourable, the line
ministry could exert little effort and produce a low output, while claiming that
this low output is due to unfavourable external conditions. The MoF is not in a
position to disentangle the two factors unless it uses some form of audit or
supervision. There is thus a risk that the line ministry captures some rent at
the expense of the MoF.14 In the principal-agent literature, this cheating rent
generally stems from lowering the level of effort vis-à-vis the compensation
received. Rents, and possible reductions in public output, compared to what is
economically efficient, constitute the agency costs.
In this article, we broaden the interpretation of corruption (generally
referred to as the abuse of public office for private benefits) to include
misgovernance stemming from the abuse of some information asymmetry.
We consider the line ministry’s effort in terms of a combination of factors that
can be good and bad, including, on the one (good) hand, an efficient and
equitable allocation of resources, fiscal transparency measures, and quality of
services provided; and, on the other (bad) hand, corruption, consumption of
perquisites, mismanagement, and nepotism in the choice of staff or suppliers.
This allows us to interpret the cheating rent, not only in terms of reduced
disutility from “productive” effort, but also as corruption or misgovernance.
For example, if the state of nature is high (say, favourable weather conditions),
the line ministry could allocate some resources to unproductive areas or divert
monies, if it thinks that the MoF could be led to believe that the state of nature
was low. In such cases, rent capture takes place and is possible because of the
information asymmetry between the principal and its agent. This
interpretation enables us to link our approach with the empirical literature on
corruption. Indeed, the latter identifies various factors contributing to
corruption, including the overall level of potential benefits from corrupt
behaviour, the cost of bribery (including penalties and sanctions), and the
bargaining power and extent of discretionary powers of the various actors
(Chand and Moene, 1999). Moreover, while cheating (exerting a lower effort) isOECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 7 – No. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 20076
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sense of being corrupt, may entail some costs to be concealed. This enables us
to make the link with the literature on collusion in organisations (e.g. Tirole,
1986) and, in Section 5, we interpret ex ante controls by the MoF as increasing
the cost of cheating for the agent.
As already stated, the MoF has a number of instruments and strategies at
its disposal to limit agency problems. First, it can use incentive schemes,
designed solely on observable information, and promise to grant the line
ministry a transfer equivalent to the sum of a suitable compensation for the line
ministry’s effort and an informational rent (which depends on incentive
compatibility constraints) in case of high productivity.15 If such a contract
exists, it prevents the line ministry from exerting little effort – but at the
expense (for the MoF) of a loss equivalent to the informational rent, in addition
to a distortion created by requiring a lower level of effort in some occurrences of
the productivity factor. Although commonly applied to models of the corporate
world (e.g. granting board members bonuses or shares), this strategy is not
always directly applicable in the public sector.16 Alternatively, the MoF can
supervise the line ministry using a number of instruments and can threaten it
with appropriate sanctions if cheating is detected. The design of the appropriate
control system must take a number of factors into account, for instance the
choice between ex ante and ex post (or internal and external) controls, the type of
variables to be monitored (input versus result indicators), and the choice
between systematic or random audits. In our model, there are two unobservable
variables (effort and state of nature). Supervision could thus turn either to the
exogenous productivity factor, from the observation of which the agent’s
behaviour could be inferred (this relates, for instance, to public sector reforms
aimed at improving the economic statistical data collection, or to audits
targeted at assessing the programme design), or directly to the agent’s effort. In
this article, we assume that the MoF will audit the line ministry’s effort.17 The
timing of the game is the same as in all principal-agent models (see Leruth and
Paul, 2006, for more details).
3. The basic model
In this article, we will not develop the details of the model but concentrate
instead on its main elements and results (for more details, refer to Leruth and
Paul, 2006).
3.1. Main assumptions
The model developed here is close to the literature on supervision, as in
Kofman and Lawarrée (1993) and Khalil and Lawarrée (2006). However, it differs
in some assumptions so as to better reflect the features of PEM systems. TheOECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 7 – No. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2007 7
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analysis, but also in those differences.
We model the agency relationship between the MoF and one line ministry,
both assumed to be risk neutral.18 The line ministry produces a level of output
x, which depends on two variables: a random exogenous productivity factor, θ;
and the line ministry actions or effort, e, such that x = α(θ,e); with αe > 0 ; αee < 0;
αθ > 0. The realised output is public knowledge, but e and θ are the line
ministry’s private information. The external productivity can be either high or
low: θi with i ∈ {H,L} and Δθ = θH – θL > 0. We also assume α(θH,e) > α(θL,e); and
αe(θH,e) > αe(θL,e) > 0. It is common knowledge that the MoF assigns ex ante
probability q to the event that i = H (and probability [1 – q] to the event that i = L).
When state i occurs, the line ministry exerts a certain effort level ei, thus
producing an output xi = α(θi,ei).
The monetary equivalent of the line ministry’s disutility from effort is
represented by an increasing and strictly convex function ψ(e), with ψe > 0 and
ψee > 0. To obtain strictly positive but bounded optimal efforts, we also
assume that α(θ,0) = 0; ψ(0) = 0; ; ; ; and
. The line ministry’s utility is given by u = t – ψ(e), where t is the
transfer (appropriation) it receives, and its reservation utility is normalised at
zero. We also assume that Δθ is large enough so that the MoF is always better
off in case of high output: xH – tH > xL – tL.
3.2. Perfect information benchmark
The MoF’s problem is to choose the levels of effort required from, and
transfers to be made to, the line ministry for each occurrence of the random
factor, so as to maximise the expected output:
(P)
Subject to the line ministry’s individual rationality (IR) or participation
constraints under each occurrence:
tH – ψ(eH) ≥ 0 IR(H)
tL – ψ(eL) ≥ 0 IR(L)
Under perfect information, the MoF equates the line ministry’s marginal
cost of effort with the marginal value of its product: , with
i {H,L}.19 The transfers are such that both participation constraints are
binding: . The MoF can therefore enforce first-best, efficient efforts,
and the line ministry gets no rent. Note too that, according to our
assumptions, .20
0
lim ee ψ→ (e) = 0 ( )0lim ,ee eα θ→ = ∞ ( )lim ee eψ→∞ = ∞
( )lim , 0ee eα θ→∞ =
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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Under imperfect information, effort is not observable. It cannot be
directly enforced, but must be indirectly induced. Therefore, the MoF must
provide the right incentives so that the line ministry produces the highest
possible level of effort. The reason is that when one productivity level takes
place, the line ministry could cheat by adjusting its effort so as to produce the
output corresponding to the other productivity level. We define the effort level
 such that . This means that, if i = H, the line ministry
could exert a low effort , and thus produce xL, while claiming to receive tL.
The “cheating rent” that the line ministry can get in that case is thus equal to
. To ensure that it is never optimal for the MoF to
shut down the contract in case of low productivity, we also assume
.
Traditional principal-agent models rely on incentive-compatible schemes
to prevent such cheating. The well-known results from this literature apply
and can be summarised as follows. At equilibrium, the line ministry does not
cheat and gets no rent when i = L. In order to induce it into exerting the right
effort level when i = H, the line ministry must receive an informational rent
equal to  (where superscript “SB” stands for “second best”) in
addition to its first-best transfer, where  is such that .
While production is efficient when i = H, the line ministry underproduces
(compared to the full information benchmark) in case of low productivity:
. Requiring a lower level of effort when i = L enables the principal to
decrease the informational rent granted to the LM when i = H. This reflects the
“rent extraction – economic efficiency” trade-off which characterises adverse
selection problems. The MoF therefore incurs an agency cost equal to the
difference in expected output between the first-best and the second-best
solutions and caused by information asymmetry.
3.4. Introducing supervision
In order to avoid forgoing the informational rent, the principal can hire a
supervisor and reduce the information asymmetry. Usually, this is combined
with the threat of penalty if cheating is detected. In introducing supervision,
we will, in some respects, diverge from the existing principal-agent literature,
so as to better reflect PEM concerns.
In the context of PEM, supervision may take various forms. One can
distinguish internal controls (e.g. MoF or line ministry agents responsible for
ensuring that expenditures and procurement are performed according to the
rules) and external controls (e.g. a court of audit reporting to parliament).
Controls may take place ex ante (e.g. comptrollers issuing visas to allow
expenditure, or automatic safeguards preventing line ministries from exceeding
Le% ( ) ( ), ,LH L Le eα θ α θ=%
Le%
( ) ( ) 0LL H Ht e t eψ ψ− − − >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦% ⎤⎦⎡⎣
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 , LL L Lq e e q eα θ ψ  ψ− > − %
( ) ( )SBSB LLe eψ ψ− %
SB
Le% ( ) ( ), ,SB SBLH L Le eα θ α θ=%
*SB
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data or the performance of public spending). Different types of controls can be
combined. For instance, going back to the example of PEM systems in Africa, it
is worth noting that the so-called francophone system rests on the principle of
separation between the person who initiates spending (the ordonnateur) and
the person who pays it (the accountant or comptable). The system relies on
centralised ex ante controls from the MoF, which take place at various stages of
the expenditure process and mainly focus on the conformity of spending with
regard to procedures and budget appropriation. Anglophone countries, on the
other hand, have inherited a decentralised management system, where the line
ministries’ accounting officers are responsible for budget execution. Ex ante
expenditure control is mainly exercised by the issue of periodic warrants by the
MoF (cash management). The anglophone system relies on independent ex post
controls by an auditor-general. In practice, however, notwithstanding those
conceptual differences and institutional arrangements, both systems have
proven to perform poorly (Bouley, Fournel and Leruth, 2002; Moussa, 2004; and
Lienert, 2003).
In the next two sections, we introduce two types of supervision. We first
study the case of ex post audits (Section 4) and explain how a standard
principal-agent model with audit may be of interest for the design of PEM
systems. We then move to ex ante controls (Section 5). In doing so, we assume
that ex ante controls increase the cost of cheating for the line ministry, as is
done in the literature on collusion.
4. Ex post audits
In this section, we introduce an ex post auditor, costing z whether or not it
identifies cheating.22 It could be an external or an internal auditor, in which
case the audit cost may be interpreted as the opportunity cost of using MoF
resources for controlling the line ministry instead of doing other tasks. The
auditor observes an imperfect signal on the line ministry’s effort (for instance,
this may be done through a review of accounts to check if there has been
corruption). We assume that the signal can take two values: “has complied”
or “has cheated”. The latter occurs only when the line ministry has indeed
cheated, while the signal can report compliance by mistake. The monitoring
function is such that σ denotes the probability of detecting actual cheating, in
which case the line ministry is imposed an exogenous penalty P. With the
introduction of supervision, the contract specifies not only the transfers and
expected outputs (and thus, implicitly, the expected effort levels), but also the
probability of audit. We assume that the MoF commits to audit with probability
γ after xL has been observed. When productivity is high, the line ministry may
cheat with probability m. Given that output is low, the probability that the line
ministry has cheated can be written as φ = qm/[(1 – q) + qm]. We also assumeOECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 7 – No. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 200710
A PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY APPROACH TO PUBLIC EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS…that the auditor is honest and does not collude with the line ministry.23 An
appealing interpretation is that developing countries are often subject to
donors’ external auditors, which are supposed to be honest (or not in a position
to negotiate with the line ministry).
We discuss three possible regimes that the MoF can implement:24 i) the
“cheating-proof” regime, which corresponds to the optimal, incentive-compatible
contract when commitment is credible; ii) the “cheating-inducing” regime, which
is not optimal but, as we argue, matches the situation in some developing
countries; and iii) a “no commitment” case, in which there is no formal
commitment to audit at the time of offering the contract, which results in a
mixed strategy equilibrium. In Subsection 4.4, we discuss some applications of
the model in terms of public expenditure management and compare these
regimes on the basis of their relative costs and benefits.
4.1. The cheating-proof regime
Traditional principal-agent models with credible commitment use the
revelation principle to determine the optimal contract. The revelation
principle asserts that, to find the optimal payoff of a problem with asymmetric
information, one can, without loss of generality, restrict it to the incentive-
compatible, individually rational scheme where every agent truthfully reveals
his/her private information. To put it simply, this means that the principal can
do no better than offer an incentive-compatible contract, which therefore
deters cheating. Under these circumstances, the penalty is never imposed at
equilibrium, but its existence out of the equilibrium path acts as a deterring
threat and prevents cheating.25
This approach is only applicable to settings in which the principal is able
to credibly commit to any outcome of the contract. In a PEM system, the
existence of a court of audit may be viewed as a commitment tool, enabling
the MoF to make the credible commitment, at the time of offering the
contract, that it will audit the line ministry at the end of the fiscal year with a
given probability, which can be either probability one (systematic audit) or
below one (random audit).26 Under this regime, there are conditions where the
audit threat is such that it prevents the line ministries from cheating.
Formally, the MoF’s problem is to choose the levels of transfers, required
efforts and audit probability so as to maximise the expected output:27
Subject to IR(L), IR(H), and the following incentive compatibility (IC)
constraint:28
IC(H)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, , , ,
, 1 ,
H L H L
H H H L L Le e t t
Max E X q e t q e t z
γ
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second-best case. Hence, provided its cost is not too high, we obtain the
intuitive result that audit benefits the principal.
As in Kofman and Lawarrée (1993), we find that the optimal contract
exhibits qualitatively different types according to the value of the parameters
(although the specific thresholds differ, as we have slightly different
assumptions; see Leruth and Paul, 2006, for proof and complete results). These
types are characterised by different rents, productive distortions and audit
probabilities. The shift from one type to the other rests on a comparison
between the expected benefits from audit (the penalty and reduction of rents
and distortions) and its cost, with both the former and the latter depending
on exogenous (country-specific) parameters. The shadow cost (Lagrange
multiplier) of the IC(H) constraint is a crucial variable in determining the
optimal institutional setting29 and it is only when the benefits from audit
exceed its cost, so that qσP > (1 – q)z, that it is profitable to audit. In that case,
the optimal probability of audit, rents and productive distortions vary, and
three sub-types can be identified:30
● “Rent extraction” (RE) scheme: The MoF audits with probability one, the
production distortion when i = L corresponds to the second-best solution,
and the line ministry gets a rent when i = H (the rent is equal to that of the
second-best solution reduced by the expected penalty).
● “Effort adjustment” (EA) scheme: The MoF still audits with probability one,
but the line ministry no longer gets a rent, and the productive distortion is
lower compared to the second-best solution (i.e. the effort level lies between
the second-best and the first-best solutions).
● “Random audit” (RA): The MoF decreases the probability of audit
(i.e. 0 < γ < 1) and still deters cheating, while the productive distortion is
smaller than in the second-best solution.31
In other words, if it is efficient, audit reduces the agency costs (distortions
and rents) associated with the second-best contract, while still deterring
cheating. When the expected penalty is relatively low, the MoF must
concomitantly use other incentives to prevent cheating. For example, our
model suggests that the line ministry could get a rent in case i = H, which
would then lead to distorting production when i = L. Nevertheless, audit
enables the MoF to reduce the rent granted to the line ministry compared to
the second-best level (hence the label “rent extraction”). When the expected
penalty rises, the threat increases for the line ministry so that the MoF can
reduce the degree of mobilisation of other incentives. In our model, the line
ministry can no longer get a rent, and so the productive distortion can be
reduced. Audit thus increases the effort requested from the line ministry in
case of low productivity (hence the label “effort adjustment”). Also, when theOECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 7 – No. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 200712
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auditing (while still deterring cheating). Finally, there remains a production
distortion when i = L, reflecting the trade-off between efficiency and the cost
of audit.
As already mentioned, these results show that, when the expected
penalty is relatively small, the MoF must concomitantly use other incentive
tools, such as informational rents, in addition to audits to be able to prevent
cheating. As the penalty threat increases, other incentives become less
necessary. When the penalty is very high, even if the MoF reduces the
probability of audit, the line ministry will not find it profitable to try to cheat.
In developed countries, like France for instance, this principle is at the root of
the “sampling” of expenditures and agencies to be audited.
Finally, note that this model may also be adapted to take into account
other constraints faced by the MoF. For example, we could think of a situation
where the MoF is obliged to comply with some minimum requirements in
terms of output (for example, the “education for all initiative” or the provision
of some basic health care package), so that it cannot tolerate that the line
ministry produces below . The MoF would still have to fulfill IC(H) at the
lowest cost (considering the additional constraint), which could be done
through a trade-off between granting the line ministry a higher rent when
i = H or raising the audit probability (if it is possible).
4.2. The cheating-inducing regime
When audit is not optimal, we have seen that the MoF should offer the
second-best contract, which is characterised by an informational rent paid to
the line ministry when the state of nature is high. However, in reality, there
may be circumstances preventing the MoF from offering that contract. For
instance, the MoF may not be in a position to grant an informational rent
when the budgeting system is input-based (line item) or if it is confronted
with a tight cash constraint. Besides, one fundamental difference between
private sector operations (which have typically been used to illustrate the
principal-agent theory) and public sector operations is often that output is
easier to quantify when it is sold on the market. Public sector output often is
not easy to quantify and must then be estimated at high cost and with
uncertainty (how many children have actually learned to read and write, how
many have been vaccinated).
There may also be political pressure or legal constraints forcing the MoF
to use ex post controls by the court of audit, even if it is not efficient to do so.
For instance, nearly all sub-Saharan African countries possess a court of audit.
Yet, findings from country financial accountability assessments (CFAAs) show
that these institutions often suffer from important weaknesses, ranging from
*
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A PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY APPROACH TO PUBLIC EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS…lack of independence to poor capacity (World Bank, 2004b), which impair their
ability to deter cheating in a significant manner. The solution recommended
by the principal-agent theory is to grant premiums to line ministries so as to
induce them not to cheat. But this solution is hardly (if at all) observed in
reality. Rather, one often observes the coexistence of a weak supreme audit
institution and high levels of cheating (including corruption), with few
positive incentives such as performance premiums.
To look into cases where there exists a court of audit which is not effective
in deterring cheating, we now introduce a “cheating-inducing” regime: the MoF
uses audit but is not able to deter cheating. We are aware that this regime is not
optimal for the principal with respect to the constraints usually considered in
the literature, as it could get the same output without incurring the cost of
audit. However, we believe that it adequately reflects the situation of some
developing countries (see Subsection 4.4 on that issue). Therefore, we consider
the case in which the MoF audits, but the penalty and audit probability are such
that . In that case, it is always in the interest of the line
ministry to cheat when feasible, and the actual output is always low. As audit
takes place, penalties will be imposed at equilibrium, but they will not be a
sufficient enough threat to deter cheating. To come back to the model, the
cheating-inducing regime takes place when the MoF commits to audit with
a probability  (where the superscript “CI” stands for
“cheating-inducing”).
Characterising the cheating-inducing regime is interesting in that it helps
understand the reasons why the MoF is unable to deter cheating. This
happens in the following cases:
● The audit probability γCI is deliberately chosen at a level that is too low.
● The parameters preclude sufficient audit – in particular, if the expected
penalty is low compared to the rent, the theoretical γ which would help
deter cheating may turn out to be higher than unity, which is irrelevant; this
case may also occur when the effectiveness of audit (σ) is too low.
● The MoF does not make use of concomitant incentives (e.g. rents and
distortions).
Finally, note that if z > qσP, audit increases the agency cost. The weight of
this component could increase when the MoF supervises several line
ministries. For instance, if some ministries are less critical than others, and
could reasonably function with low production levels, agency costs could be
reduced by offering cheating-inducing contracts, thus saving on auditing
costs. The money saved could be used to provide the incentives to the priority
line ministries and offer them a cheating-proof contract, thus ensuring high
production (when i = H) in these sectors.
⁽ ⁾ ⁽ ⁾LH H Lt e t e Pψ ψ γ σ− < − −%
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So far, we have considered that the MoF could credibly commit, at the
time of offering the contract, to audit the line ministry with a given probability
once output is observed. However, commitment to audit suffers from a time
inconsistency problem: the contract determined by the revelation principle is
optimal ex ante but entails inefficiencies ex post. Indeed, as the contract deters
cheating, the audit cost must be incurred without any compensation in terms
of collected penalty. Moreover, as the contracted effort is not efficient when
i = L, one obtains a Pareto improvement by renegotiating the contract once
information has been revealed. This time inconsistency reduces the credibility
of the commitment to audit, all the more if the MoF is facing a tight budget
constraint.33 Other reasons may also contribute to preclude the commitment
to audit, for instance the difficulty of verifying whether the principal did
indeed abide by its committed random audit strategy (Mookherjee and Png,
1989) or, in practice, the absence of adequate legal institutions. In particular,
we have so far assumed that the existence of a court of audit in the country
consisted in a commitment control. Yet, the inefficiency of the court of audit
and related institutions may reduce the credibility of the commitment.
Nevertheless, in such situations where the MoF cannot credibly commit to
auditing, it can call upon some external auditors for specific tasks.
In this subsection, we drop the assumption that the MoF commits to
auditing at the time of offering the contract. However, once output is observed,
the MoF can decide to audit if it proves to be efficient ex post, i.e. if the MoF
expects to get “value for money” out of the audit. Indeed, when the output is
produced, it is too late to deter cheating – but the MoF can still earn a penalty
if cheating is detected. The MoF will be willing to audit only if the expected
penalty is at least equal to the audit cost. Moreover, the mere expectation that
the MoF may audit will reduce the line ministry’s incentive to cheat.
Formally, with no commitment, the revelation principle cannot be used
and audit must be optimal ex post to justify its cost. Hence, cheating may occur
in equilibrium (i.e. the probability of cheating is positive), and the MoF can
expect to collect a penalty. The MoF’s problem is to choose the levels of
transfers, effort and audit probability so as to maximise its objective function:
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and the constraints now encompass the probability of cheating by the line
ministry (Subsections 4.1 and 4.2 correspond to corner solutions of this
general problem). The two IC constraints consist of indifference conditions
and determine the game, which is played simultaneously by the MoF and the
line ministry. Indeed, the line ministry is indifferent between cheating and
being honest when . The MoF observes xL, and is
indifferent between auditing and not auditing when φσP = z.
This problem yields a mixed-strategy equilibrium. Under this regime,
production is efficient and the line ministry gets no rent. The equilibrium is
obtained when the MoF audits with probability  and the
line ministry cheats with probability m = [z(1 – q)/(σP – z)q]. Note that penalties
are collected at equilibrium and are exactly offset by the cost of audit. Moreover,
as it entails no production distortion, the mixed-strategy equilibrium tends to
the first-best when the penalty is very large or audit is free.34
To our knowledge, the literature has not attempted to directly compare
regimes with and without commitment, because commitment to audit is
usually considered desirable as it reduces the ex ante cost of inducing truthful
reporting (Baron and Besanko, 1984). The limited commitment due to the
possibility of renegotiating a contract is typically handled by using the
renegotiation-proofness principle. The latter, which is somewhat similar to
the revelation principle, says that one can, without loss of generality, restrict
the set of possible contracts to the class of contracts that are not renegotiated.
Renegotiation-proof constraints are thus added to the set of IRs and ICs
(e.g. Bolton, 1990; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1990; but see also Aghion,
Dewatripont and Rey, 1994). In practice, commitment may entail some costs,
including those linked to the creation of an adequate institutional setting such
as the creation of a court of audit. Our framework allows a comparison of the
agency costs associated with each regime. For instance, one observes that the
agency cost of our mixed-strategy equilibrium consists mainly of the loss of
production (when i = H and the agent cheats). However, when external audits
are cheap, and/or the expected penalty is large, the cheating probability
decreases and the mixed strategy becomes a better option. This could reduce
the value of establishing a court of audit if it does not yet exist in the country.
4.4. Applying the theoretical framework to PEM systems
The sections above explain the different control regimes the MoF can
implement, according (notably) to the audit probability it chooses. The optimality
of these regimes depends on the value of exogenous, country-specific parameters
such as the level of penalty, the quality of the supervision technique, the cost of
audit, and the probability of high productivity. This suggests that the need to base
the choice of the control design on a good analysis cannot be overemphasised
⁽ ⁾ ⁽ ⁾LH H Lt e t e Pψ ψ γσ− = − −%
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model provides an analytical framework that can guide PEM reforms, as it allows
for comparing different institutional designs while taking into account the
constraints faced by governments.
Generally speaking, the MoF should choose the audit regime associated
with the lowest agency cost. Yet, the regimes vary with the institutional
setting. The cheating-proof regime corresponds to a situation where the MoF
can credibly commit ex ante to auditing with a given probability, for instance
if a court of audit exists. This regime can be compared directly with the
second-best contract, and the choice will depend on the ratio qσP/(1 – q)z. The
mixed strategy relies on a different assumption: there is no commitment, but
the MoF can choose ex post whether to resort to external auditors for specific
tasks. To compare these two frameworks, one should add the fixed cost of
setting up and running the institutions necessary to allow commitment
(e.g. the cost of creating a court of audit) to the agency cost of the cheating-proof
regime.
In theory all the regimes discussed above could be implemented. In
practice, however, additional constraints may restrain the choices available to
the MoF, especially in developing countries. On the one hand, several factors
may contribute to reducing the ratio qσP/(1 – q)z which conditions the value of
audit in those countries. When cheating is detected, the penalty faced by line
ministries may be very small or rarely enforced (see, for example, Dia, 1996;
Lienert, 2003; Moussa, 2004), all the more if discounted at a high rate (because of
the time required for implementation) and if the supervision technology is not
performing well (low σ, for instance due to poor fiscal data; see, for example,
Bouley, Fournel and Leruth, 2002); the probability of high output may be low,
compared to that expected in industrial countries; and the opportunity cost of
audit may be high, considering the scarcity of competent human resources.
Therefore, while the MoF can probably deter cheating through ex post audits in
industrial countries, this may not be so easy in developing countries.
Practical constraints may also restrict the MoF’s actions:
● A tight cash constraint and/or the framework of line-item budgeting may
limit the availability of informational rents.35
● The government may have committed to provide a minimum package of
services, which prevents production distortions below a certain level (the
level obtained under the optimal contract).
● The MoF may be legally or politically obliged to resort to the court of audit,
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MoF cannot enforce the second-best contract (for practical reasons), it can
only implement the cheating-inducing regime: the most unfavourable for the
MoF, and a regime that is never optimal.
Note that our analytical framework may be extended to evaluate various
reforms. One can think of reforms to increase the quality of audit, or to use
signalling to help determine productivity (e.g. collecting economic information
on the sector and/or auditing the quality of the approved programme design).
5. Ex ante controls36
We have so far considered that, notwithstanding the risk of being caught
ex post, cheating is costless for the agent. This assumption is common in the
literature because the cheating rent generally consists of a reduction in the
effort made by the agent, which remains his/her private information. But the
line ministry’s effort may also comprise some negative actions (such as
corruption), and this leads us to assume that cheating entails some costs to be
concealed. This allows us to make the link with the economic literature on
collusion in organisations.37 The literature distinguishes two types of
collusion costs, according to whether they are exogenous (e.g. negotiation
costs, “physical” strategies to divert monies from their intended purposes) or
endogenous (e.g. costs stemming from the risk of future detection; see
Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort, 1999; Khalil and Lawarrée, 2006). Ways
in which the principal can avoid corruption include: i) create incentive
payments; ii) decrease the stake of collusion; and iii) increase the transaction
cost of collusion (Laffont and Rochet, 1997). In this section, we introduce an
exogenous cost of cheating and explain how it affects the constraints of the
MoF’s problem. In a second step, we interpret ex ante controls, undertaken by
the MoF before the commitment and/or the payment of the line ministry’s
expenditures, as increasing the cost of cheating. We then discuss the relative
value of ex post and ex ante controls.
5.1. Exogenous cost of cheating
We assume that the line ministry incurs a certain cost η ≥ 0 when it
cheats. That cost decreases the expected benefits from cheating. If we first
consider a model without ex post audit, the MoF’s problem can be written as:
Subject to IR(L) and:
IR(H)
IC(H)
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, the line ministry will always cheat (m = 1) unless
appropriate incentives are provided. For instance, the second-best contract in
this case would also entail a rent when i = H and a productive distortion when
i = L, but these would be reduced by the cheating cost. If the cost of cheating is
high enough and , the line ministry will not cheat
(m = 0) and the MoF will reach the first-best solution [no rent and efficient
production, as IC(H) is not binding]. It is thus in the MoF’s interest to increase
the cost of cheating. This is discussed further in the next subsection.
5.2. Ex ante controls as increasing the cost of cheating
Most traditional principal-agent models consider monitoring at the ex post
stage.38 Deterring cheating (or collusion) ex ante is done by granting rewards
and/or through a threat of future punishment. For their part, PEM systems also
include a series of controls designed to prevent agents from cheating ex ante. For
example, automatic tools, such as computer-based systems that check the
budget appropriations before allowing spending, are designed for that purpose,
and a similar role is played by the financial comptrollers placed by the MoF
within line ministries. Such controls are particularly extensive in the
francophone treasury system (Bouley, Fournel and Leruth, 2002) but also exist in
the anglophone system (Diamond, 2002). As observation suggests, however,
these control techniques are not perfect, partly because agents are very active
in trying to bypass them (Lienert, 2003; Moussa, 2004).
We hereafter interpret setting up ex ante controls implemented by the
MoF as increasing the line ministry’s cost of cheating.39 We endogenise the
cost of cheating as a decision variable of the MoF and first consider a model
without ex post audit.
Assume that c represents the cost of the ex ante controls. It may be
interpreted as the cost of implementing and running controls, but also as the
economic cost (sometimes heavy) of procedures that may complicate the
expenditure process and reduce the line ministry’s absorptive capacity.40 The
line ministry’s cost of cheating η(c) is now endogenous and depends on the
controls implemented by the MoF. We assume ηc > 0, ηcc > 0, η(0) = 0, and
.41 We limit our analysis to the specification of incentive-compatible
schemes (thus, where the MoF deters cheating). The MoF will decide on the
levels of ex ante control, transfer and effort so as to maximise its expected
output, as follows:
Subject to IR(L), IR(H) [which now has the form: tH – ψ(eH) ≥ 0] and
IC(H)
⁽ ⁾ ⁽ ⁾LH H Lt e t eψ ψ η− < − −%
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performance of ex ante controls is “intrinsic” (depending on η), and does not
depend on external factors like the level of penalty; ii) the cost of controls is
incurred ex ante, whatever the state of nature, while the cost of audit is
incurred, if at all, only when a low output is observed; and iii) the decision
parameter of the MoF is bounded in the case of ex post audits while, in theory,
the MoF could increase ex ante controls infinitely (although it would not be
efficient to do so).
The results and proofs related to this discussion are presented in Leruth
and Paul (2006). Once again, the problem remains to respect IC(H) at the lowest
cost, hence the importance of the shadow cost (Lagrance multiplier) of that
constraint. We first show that it is not efficient to increase controls above a
certain point where [1/ηc(c)] ≥ q. If the cost of deterring cheating by controls
alone is too high (i.e. when the minimum level of control that would be
necessary to deter cheating, , would be such that [1/ηc(c)] > q),
the MoF must also use other means to deter cheating, including rents and
productive distortions. For instance, the line ministry could be granted a rent
when i = H (the level of this rent decreases with the amount of control by the
MoF) and be required to produce the second-best level of effort when i = L. In
that case, the MoF’s expected output corresponds to the second-best solution.
When ex ante controls are sufficiently effective to allow the MoF to deter
cheating by raising controls (until a point such that [1/ηc(c)] < q), the line
ministry gets no rent. However, it may be profitable for the MoF to distort the
required effort, if it can save by reducing the level of controls. The MoF would
then choose the level of control and the effort required when i = L by
comparing their cost, i.e. so as to relax IC(H) at the lowest cost. The trade-off
here is between increased efficiency and the cost of control.
The results do not fundamentally differ from the cheating-proof regime
with ex post audits. Both types of control are assessed with regard to their
ability to deter cheating, and if their cost is too high relative to their benefits,
the MoF has to use other means (rents and distortions). Yet, one can compare
the relative value of both types of controls on the basis of the shadow cost
of each problem’s IC(H) constraint, i.e. the Lagrange multiplier of those
constraints at equilibrium. Both indeed measure the difficulty of deterring
cheating, and determine the agency costs (cost of control, rents and
production distortions) associated with each regime. For instance, it is not
profitable for the MoF to increase the level of ex ante controls when [1/ηc(c)] > q,
nor to use ex post audits when [(1 – q)z + λγ]/σP > q. An analysis of shadow
costs reveals that both thresholds depend on the probability that i = H. It also
reveals that the higher the probability of high output, the higher the incentive
to use controls to guarantee it. Second, the effect of ex post audits on relaxing
the constraint IC(H) is mitigated by the size of the expected penalty. As already
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ex post audits may not be able to deter cheating, making ex ante controls more
effective. Third, if penalties are a credible threat, ex post audits may prove to be
effective because their cost is incurred only when the principal observes a low
output (i.e. with probability [1 – q] under a cheating-proof regime) contrary to
ex ante controls which are imposed in a nondiscriminatory manner.
5.3. Integrating ex ante and ex post controls
We now briefly consider (without explicitly solving) the case in which the
MoF can deter cheating through a combination of ex ante controls and ex post
audits. Limiting ourselves to incentive-compatible schemes, the MoF’s
problem is to maximise the expected output:
Subject to IR(L), IR(H) and:
IC(H)
Under a combined approach, the most interesting case occurs when the
MoF simultaneously uses both types of controls. This may only take place
when λ = 1/ηc(c) = [(1 – q)z + λγ]/σP ≤ q. This may be interpreted as linking the
cost-effectiveness of each type of control and comparing their costs (resp. c
and [(1 – q)z + λγ]) to their effectiveness in deterring cheating (which depends
on η and σP). When the MoF uses both audits and controls in combination, it
will thus equate the relative contribution of each type of control. Finally, the
optimal level of ex ante controls and probability of ex post audits, as well as the
production distortion when i = L and the possible rent when i = H, will be
determined simultaneously, so as to satisfy the constraint IC(H) at the
lowest cost.
6. Conclusion
We have argued that the principal-agent theory offers a powerful analytical
framework to better understand PEM systems and guide their design in
developing countries. The model discussed in this article equally applies to
“managerial” systems relying on ex post audits (in the British tradition) and to
systems relying more on ex ante controls (in many francophone African
countries). It allows for comparisons between institutional settings
(e.g. depending on whether or not the MoF is able to commit to a certain audit
probability) and types of control (e.g. comparing the effectiveness of ex post
audits and ex ante controls) by examining the cost-effectiveness of various tools
available to the principal to deter cheating. However, this often entails some
productive distortions, which result from a trade-off between economic
efficiency, on the one hand, and the cost of control and/or an informational
rent, on the other hand. Finally, we have interpreted corruption and the lack of
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A PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY APPROACH TO PUBLIC EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS…governance as “rents” captured by the line ministries at the expense of their
principal as a result of the informational advantage. By assuming that the
agent’s effort encompasses productive effort, as well as negative actions such as
those related to corruption, we have linked the model to the literature on
collusion in organisations.
The model shows that several regimes can exist and that their optimality
depends on country-specific parameters, hence the importance of basing the
choice of a PEM system on a detailed analysis. Nevertheless, it is possible to
draw a few general lessons that can help PEM advisors address some
important issues:
● Ex post controls (which we mostly assimilate to a court of audit in this
article) should be used up to the point where their marginal cost is equal to
their return in terms of improved economic efficiency. This will depend on
several parameters such as arbitrarily low or ineffective penalties (often the
result of social pressure or a weak judicial system in developing countries).
Rather than setting up a court of audit (they do not exist in all countries), it
may then be profitable to rely on other tools such as external, private audit
firms, which increase the cost of cheating for the line ministries. In certain
conditions, we also stress the importance of setting up a court of audit so as
to make the commitment assumption credible and, in conjunction with
better funding, increase its activities, thereby increasing the deterring
aspect of the threat of punishment.
● The effectiveness of internal controls is similarly determined by cost-
benefit considerations, but money spent on internal controls tends to be
more effective than money spent on ex post controls in developing
countries. An important parameter is the extent to which these controls
can be bypassed, for example through the use of extraordinary procedures.
The cost of internal controls should be assessed carefully, taking into
account not only the cost of additional controllers or systems, but also the
economic cost due to the resulting slowdown of the expenditure process.
● In countries where the efficiency of both internal and external controls is
dubious, theory recommends that the line ministry should be granted an
“informational rent” in the form of a transfer above the compensation for
the effort made. However, in practice, and beyond the difficulty of
implementing such schemes in a public sector context in many countries,
the efficiency of informational rents may be reduced if appropriate
performance measures on which to base the contract between the MoF and
the line ministry are unreliable or even unavailable.
● The model may also help sequence reforms, although we do not develop
this aspect in the article. As causes for the poor performance of the PEM
system are identified, it is possible to decide what measures should takeOECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 7 – No. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 200722
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introducing internal controls, nor to grant informational rents, it is trapped
in the so-called cheating-inducing regime. A first step could be to announce
that private audit firms will be hired. In our model, this would relate to
implementing a mixed-strategy equilibrium, which tends to be an easily
implementable and cheaper solution (as it incurs no fixed cost) to reduce
the extent of cheating. If the country lacks reliable fiscal data, ex post audits
are not very effective, and the priority should be to reinforce the accounting
system before reinvigorating the court of audit.
Finally, although the principal-agent theory provides very interesting
insights for the design of PEM systems, we have only considered a few aspects
and many more are worth exploring. For instance, a principal-agent analysis
could be applied to the allocation of resources for control purposes between
different line ministries (for example because they have different probabilities
of cheating). Future research could also focus on the dynamic aspects of PEM
design and take into account the repeated interactions between the MoF and
line ministries at the time the contract is prepared. Although not easily
tractable, the realities of the negotiation process between the MoF and the line
ministries are very complex, with some line ministries being better informed
than others.
Notes
1. However, there is a growing literature on performance, programme and output
budgeting, which basically aims to improve the information available on the
effectiveness of public expenditure, and hence helps improve performance
through enhanced accountability.
2. This assessment was initiated in 2002 and recently updated (see IDA/IMF, 2002
and 2005).
3. More recently, several bilateral donors and multilateral institutions have set up the
public expenditure and financial accountability (PEFA) programme. It aims to build
a strategic and collaborative approach to assessing and reforming partner countries’
public expenditure, procurement and financial accountability systems, and
identifies a set of performance indicators and benchmarks in order to help address
developmental and fiduciary objectives. It has developed a public financial
management (PFM) performance measurement system, and assesses PFM systems
against six critical objectives: budget realism; comprehensive, policy-based budget;
fiscal management; information; control; accountability and transparency. The
sixteen criteria are presented in Appendix I of Leruth and Paul (2006).
4. This interpretation is consistent with that of political and social sciences, which
refer to the broader notion of “rent capture” rather than corruption.
5. In some countries, such as Belgium and Lebanon, the court of audit may also
perform some ex ante control. In this article, we restrict our attention to the
functions of ex ante in contrast to ex post controls, irrespective of the institution
performing them.OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 7 – No. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2007 23
A PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY APPROACH TO PUBLIC EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS…6. The “mise en débêt” is a tool to make public accountants personally responsible for
financial wrongdoings discovered in their management of public funds by the
court of audit or similar body.
7. Note that assuming a strict agency relationship between the MoF and the line
ministry is a simplification of realities. A powerful line ministry could often play a
very important role in budget negotiations, simply because it has more knowledge
about requirements in its own area than the MoF. This could be particularly true at
the time of budget preparation, where the line ministry could consider itself as an
equal partner to the MoF.
8. Potter and Diamond (1999) and Bouley, Fournel and Leruth (2002) discuss several of
these constraints.
9. This is in line with the approach adopted, for instance, in the Australian budgeting
system, where so-called service and resource allocation agreements are prepared
and implemented (New South Wales Treasury, 2000).
10. For example, if the health system in a country does not perform well, say in terms
of vaccination ratios, it can be because the health ministry focuses on other things
(and could do those efficiently). It could also be because the money appropriated
for the purchase of vaccines gets “lost” in the system. A weak PEM system would
generally refer to the latter. See, for example, Gupta and Verhoeven (2001).
11. To quote a very practical definition from the New South Wales Treasury: “Output
budgeting involves the Executive Government explicitly ‘purchasing’ outputs from
program and service delivery agencies (the ‘providers’) in order to achieve desired
Government outcomes [...]. With performance budgeting, the Executive Government
funds (or ‘purchases’) an agency’s program and delivery plan (a set of program and
delivery strategies) which the agency has developed in order to achieved desired
Government outcomes” (New South Wales Treasury, 2000, p. 13).
12. Ideally, these objectives are defined in the context of a medium-term (three-year)
framework and based on a comprehensive macroeconomic model. A multi-year
budget framework has the potential to improve incentives, for instance by allowing
the introduction of intertemporal competition across agents (Ahmad and Martinez,
2004). Although we will not address this issue in the context of the article, it is
important to note that the lack of a proper framework for medium-term budgeting
has also been identified by the IMF and the World Bank as an area that requires
substantial strengthening.
13. The PRSP approach was launched in 1999 in the context of the HIPC initiative. A
PRSP describes a country’s macroeconomic, structural and social policies and
programmes to promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated external
financing needs. Its preparation and implementation now often condition the
release of aid funds and debt relief.
14. Hereafter we use the term “informational rent” when referring to the supplementary
premium that the line ministry is deliberately granted as an incentive to exert high
effort. We use the term “cheating rent” to refer to the amount illegally diverted,
notably through corruption.
15. In this article, we use indifferently “performance payment” (contingent on
observable/verifiable results) and “informational rent” although the latter is, in
principle, more general (the difference between the expected utility of an agent
with private information and his/her reservation utility).OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 7 – No. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 200724
A PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY APPROACH TO PUBLIC EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS…16. Incentive schemes may be used in public companies (see, for instance, the
regulation theory following Laffont and Tirole, 1993) and also, to some extent, in
customs administrations (on the theoretical side, see, for instance, Besley and
McLaren, 1993). 
17. A model close to ours, which combines adverse selection and moral hazard,
predicts that monitoring the agent’s action is strictly preferable to auditing private
information (Kessler, 2000).
18. In practice, the MoF would try to maximise the joint output of several line
ministries. By restricting the model to one line ministry, we assume that the MoF
treats all line ministries equally. The case of several line ministries is indirectly
handled when the probability of audit is below one (notably in the mixed strategy
equilibrium), which may be interpreted as follows: the MoF can possibly audit only
a certain number of line ministries, and each line ministry chooses its cheating
level considering that probability of being audited.
19. Superscript “*” stands for first-best values.
20. This could be interpreted as an absorptive capacity constraint: when the state of
nature is high, the line ministry must work harder to absorb a larger appropriation.
21. For example, if a government is not allowed to use an overdraft facility with the
Central Bank, the rule can be interpreted as a safeguard. 
22. Assuming the auditor is paid only when reporting cheating is not relevant in a PEM
system, although there are many instances where a bonus is given when cheating
is detected (for example, customs employees detecting a fraud have a right to a
portion of the tax recovered in many countries).
23. Note that this assumption is also made by Kofman and Lawarrée (1993) in their
regime with one costly truthful auditor, as well as in Khalil (1997), for example.
24. We use a terminology similar to that of Eskeland and Thiele (1999) who refer to
collusion-proof and collusion-inducing regimes, as we refer to cheating-proof and
cheating-inducing regimes.
25. This may seem a little remote from reality. However, the revelation principle
characterises the optimal payoffs and can be seen as the “truth-telling map” of a
complex mechanism where cheating and punishments occur (Kofman and Lawarrée,
1993, p. 648).
26. If there are several line ministries, the latter situation could correspond to the case
where the MoF announces it will audit a certain number of line ministries – so that
each line ministry knows, ex ante, with which probability it will be audited at the
end of the year.
27. The probability of cheating and the expected penalty do not enter the principal’s
objective function as, under this regime, cheating is deterred. However, the expected
penalty appears in the IC constraint.
28. To be complete, one should also introduce an IC(L) constraint, aimed at preventing
the line ministry from producing the high output when productivity is low. This
would take the form . But, as is common in the literature, that
constraint is redundant with the others and is therefore not relevant. Note also
that, as we use the revelation principle and deter cheating, the optimal solution
exhibits no cheating. The penalty is not collected in equilibrium and hence it does
not enter the MoF’s objective function (although it is present in the constraints).
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A PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY APPROACH TO PUBLIC EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS…29. Note that, from the specification of that Lagrange multiplier, one observes that the
higher the cost of audit and/or the probability of low productivity, and the lower
the penalty, the harder it is to deter cheating.
30. Our results are consistent with the analysis of Kofman and Lawarrée (1993) with a
truthful auditor. There are some slight differences, however.
31. The random audit case may be interpreted in a context with several line
ministries, where γ represents the probability, for each line ministry, to be audited
in the framework of the general auditing policy of the MoF.
32. Mixed-strategy equilibriums have generally been used in the literature on collusion.
The latter suggests that, instead of trying to systematically deter (or induce)
collusion, it may be efficient to allow it to some extent (e.g. Kofman and Lawarrée,
1996; Khalil, 1997; Khalil and Lawarrée, 2006). This may be the case, for example, if
there is a positive probability that the agent and the supervisor are honest, so that
it may be too costly to provide incentives to systematically deter collusion. We
hereafter apply a similar approach to cheating (corruption). We do not model it; but,
in a context with several line ministries, the mixed-strategy equilibrium could also
yield the optimal contract when some line ministries are honest while others are
corrupt, because preventing cheating as if all line ministries were corrupt would be
too costly.
33. This argument holds in one-period games. However, in the context of repeated
relationships, it is probably in the MoF’s interest not to backtrack on its promise to
audit with the announced probability, in order to preserve its reputation.
34. Our results are quite intuitive. Both the probability of audit and the probability of
cheating are decreasing functions of the expected penalty. The more cheating rent
the line ministry can capture, the more the MoF audits. The more expensive the audit,
the more the line ministry cheats. The cheating probability is also influenced by the
relative probabilities of the productivity occurrences: to keep the MoF indifferent
between auditing and not auditing, cheating is increasing with the probability of low
productivity. The agency cost decreases with the expected penalty and increases with
the probability of low productivity. It is also higher when the difference of production
between i = H and i = L is higher.
35. Informational rents could be envisaged in a system of performance budgeting, as
they consist of rewarding the line ministry for good performance (above the
compensation of its effort).
36. This section deals with an issue not often discussed in principal-agent papers
where the focus tends to be on controls run ex post.
37. Following Tirole (1986), that branch of the literature studies the potential for side-
contracting between a privately informed, cheating agent and the supervisor hired
by the principal to control him or her.
38. As an exception to this statement, Strausz (2006) compares the value of
monitoring versus auditing – but our analysis differs from Strausz’s in that we do
not assume that ex post audit and ex ante controls rely on the same technology.
39. The literature on collusion adopts a similar approach when it acknowledges that
hiring a collusive auditor is still useful, because it makes shirking costly for the
agent, as he/she will have to pay a bribe to falsify the report (e.g. Kofman and
Lawarrée, 1996).OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 7 – No. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 200726
A PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY APPROACH TO PUBLIC EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS…40. For instance, in Senegal, the procedures for disbursing the Health Decentralization
Fund are such that it takes on average ten months for the resources to be at the
disposal of the providers. This leaves only two months to the facility to absorb
those resources (World Bank, 2004a).
41. The more effective the controls, the higher η(c) for any c > 0.
References
Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont and P. Rey (1994), “Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable
Information”, Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2, pp. 257-282.
Ahmad, Ehtisham and Leonardo Martinez (2004), “On the Design of Targeted
Expenditure Programs”, IMF Working Paper 04/220, International Monetary Fund,
Washington DC.
Ahmad, Ehtisham, Eivind Tandberg and Ping Zhang (2002), “On National and
Supranational Objectives: Improving the Effectiveness of Targeted Expenditure
Programs”, IMF Working Paper 02/209, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.
Baiman, Stanley, John H. Evans and Nandu J. Nagarajan (1991), “Collusion in Auditing”,
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 29, pp. 1-18.
Baron, David and David Besanko (1984), “Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and
Auditing”, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 447-470.
Baron, David and Roger Myerson (1982), “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown
Costs”, Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 911-930.
Bayart, Jean-François (1993), The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, Longman, New York,
United States.
Besley, Timothy and John McLaren (1993), “Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage
Incentives”, Economic Journal, Vol. 103, No. 416, pp. 119-141.
Bolton, Patrick (1990), “Renegotiation and the Dynamics of Contract Design”, European
Economic Review, Vol. 34, No. 2-3, pp. 303-310.
Bouley, Dominique, Jerôme Fournel and Luc Leruth (2002), “How Do Treasury Systems
Operate in Sub-Saharan Francophone Africa?”, OECD Journal on Budgeting, Vol. 2,
No. 4, pp. 49-84.
Chand, Sheetal K. and Karl O. Moene (1999), “Controlling Fiscal Corruption”, World
Development, Vol. 27, No. 7, pp. 1129-1140.
Dabla-Norris, Era and Elisabeth Paul (2006), “What Transparency Can Do When Incentives
Fail: An Analysis of Rent Capture”, IMF Working Paper 06/146, International Monetary
Fund, Washington DC.
Dewatripont, Mathias and Eric Maskin (1990), “Contract Renegotiation in Models of
Asymmetric Information”, European Economic Review, Vol. 34, pp. 311-321.
Dia, Mamadou (1993), “A Governance Approach to Civil Service Reform in Sub-Saharan
Africa”, World Bank Technical Paper No. 225, World Bank, Washington DC.
Dia, Mamadou (1996), Africa’s Management in the 1990s and Beyond: Reconciling Indigenous
and Transplanted Institutions, World Bank, Washington DC.
Diamond, Jack (2002), “The Role of Internal Audit in Government Financial Management:
An International Perspective”, IMF Working Paper 02/94, International Monetary
Fund, Washington DC.OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 7 – No. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2007 27
A PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY APPROACH TO PUBLIC EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS…Diamond, Jack (2006), “Budget System Reform in Emerging Economies: The Challenges
and the Reform Agenda”, Occasional Paper No. 245, International Monetary Fund,
Washington DC.
Eskeland, Gunnar S. and Henrik Thiele (1999), “Corruption Under Moral Hazard”,
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2204, World Bank, Washington DC.
Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (1999), “The
Endogenous Transaction Costs of Delegated Auditing”, European Economic Review,
Vol. 43, No. 4-6, pp. 1039-1048.
Gupta, Sanjeev and Marijn Verhoeven (2001), “The Efficiency of Government Expenditure:
Experiences from Africa”, Journal of Policy Modeling, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 433-467.
IDA (International Development Association) and IMF (International Monetary Fund)
(2002), “Actions to Strengthen the Tracking of Poverty-Reducing Public Spending in
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs)”, March, Washington DC.
IDA/IMF (2005), “Update on the Assessments and Implementation of Action Plans to
Strengthen Capacity of HIPCs to Track Poverty-Reducing Public Spending”, April,
Washington DC.
Kessler, Anke (2000), “On Monitoring and Collusion in Hierarchies”, Journal of Economic
Theory, Vol. 91, No. 2, pp. 280-291.
Khalil, Fahad (1997), “Auditing Without Commitment”, RAND Journal of Economics,
Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 629-640.
Khalil, Fahad and Jacques Lawarrée (2006), “Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the
Absence of Commitment”, Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 269-291.
Kofman, Fred and Jacques Lawarrée (1993), “Collusion in Hierarchical Agency”,
Econometrica, Vol. 61, No. 3, pp. 629-656.
Kofman, Fred and Jacques Lawarrée (1996), “On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion”,
Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 61, No. 3, pp. 383-407.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and David Martimort (2002), The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-
Agent Model, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, United States.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean-Charles Rochet (1997), “Collusion in Organizations”,
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 99, No. 4, pp. 485-495.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and
Regulation, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States.
Leruth, Luc and Elisabeth Paul (2006), “A Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public
Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries”, IMF Working
Paper 06/204, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.
Lienert, Ian C. (2003), “A Comparison Between Two Public Expenditure Management
Systems in Africa”, OECD Journal on Budgeting, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 35-66.
Mbaku, John Mukum (ed.) (1998), Corruption and the Crisis of Institutional Reforms in
Africa, African Studies Series, Vol. 47, Edwin Mellen Press, New York, United States.
Mookherjee, Dilip and Ivan Png (1989), “Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 104, No. 2, pp. 399-415.
Moussa, Yaya (2004), “Public Expenditure Management in Francophone Africa: A
Cross-Country Analysis”, IMF Working Paper 04/42, International Monetary Fund,
Washington DC.OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 7 – No. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 200728
A PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY APPROACH TO PUBLIC EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS…New South Wales Treasury (2000), The Financial Management Framework for the
General Government Sector, December, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia,
www.treasury.nsw.gov.au/pubs_by_pol.
Potter, Barry and Jack Diamond (1999), Guidelines for Public Expenditure Management,
International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.
Reinikka, Ritva and Jakob Svensson (2004), “Local Capture: Evidence from a Central
Government Transfer Program in Uganda”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119,
No. 2, pp. 679-705.
République du Cameroun, Institut National de la Statistique (2004), “Enquête sur le
suivi des dépenses publiques et la satisfaction des bénéficiaires dans les secteurs
de l’éducation et de la santé. Phase I : Volet Santé”, rapport principal des résultats
(version provisoire du 12 mars), Yaoundé, Cameroun.
Schick, Allen (1997), Modern Budgeting, OECD, Paris.
Schick, Allen (1998), “Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand
Reforms”, The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 123-131.
Strausz, Roland (2006), “Timing of Verification Procedures: Monitoring Versus Auditing”,
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 59, No. 1, pp. 89-107.
Tanzi, V. (2000), “Rationalizing the Government Budget: Or Why Fiscal Policy Is So
Difficult”, in Anne O. Krueger (ed.), Economic Policy Reform: The Second Stage, University
of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, United States, pp. 435-452.
Tirole, Jean (1986), “Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in
Organizations”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 181-214.
World Bank (1997), “Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank”,
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management, World Bank, Washington DC.
World Bank (2004a), “Senegal Public Expenditure Review”, Report No. 29357-SN, PREM 4,
Africa Region, World Bank, Washington DC.
World Bank (2004b), “Supporting and Strengthening Supreme Audit Institutions: A
World Bank Strategy”, Financial Management Network, Operations Policy and
Country Services, World Bank, Washington DC.
Ye, Xiao and Sudharshan Canagarajah (2002), “Efficiency of Public Expenditure
Distribution and Beyond: A Report on Ghana’s 2000 Public Expenditure Tracking
Survey in the Sectors of Primary Health and Education”, Africa Region Working Paper
Series No. 31, World Bank, Washington DC.OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 7 – No. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2007 29

